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*27  DETHRONING STATE SECURITY: INTRODUCING A HUMAN
SECURITY PERSPECTIVE TO ABSORB THE DANGERS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE TO THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF ISLAND STATE
INHABITANTS
One unmistakable and indisputable consequence of Climate Change is found in the realm of oceans. Sea-levels are currently
rising at a pace unknown to mankind and as a consequence island states are destined to lose habitable land territory. Whereas
some may lose parts, others will lose all of it in the current business as usual scenario. This reality first begs the question as
to whether an island state will continue to be a state once bereft of a territorial basis. Secondly, it must be considered how
islanders might retain legal personality should this is no longer be possible through the institution of statehood as it exists in
positive law. Donning a long-term perspective and taking into account the need for a state to be an effective duty-holder for
its citizens, a state may arguably no longer be an effective state when missing the statehood criterion of habitable territory.
However, this finding need not create a non liquet situation where we can only point out a gap in law to stare at, or revert to
creative solutions such as recognizing deterritorialized entities as states with permanent ex situ governments. When setting
aside a classical approach focusing fixedly on ways to ensure state security, the islanders' predicament can be viewed through
a human security approach, which taps into the humanized side of today's international law and allows us to acknowledge
that the islanders' situation is embedded in much more than the lore of statehood. With this awareness, it can be concluded
that to attempt retaining the legal personality, cultural identity and effective empowerment of islanders without an island--
a people's human right to self-determination needs to take center stage.
INTRODUCTION
Climate change has a profound impact on our planet. One unmistakable and indisputable consequence is found in the
realm of oceans. Sea-levels are currently rising at a pace unknown to mankind and water has already engulfed islands--
such as the Carteret Islands-- *28  to the extent of inundation or inhabitability due to complete salinization. As an
obvious consequence, island states are destined to lose habitable land territory. 1  Whereas some may lose parts, others
will lose all of it in the current business as usual scenario. This first begs the question as to whether such an island state
will continue to be a state once bereft of a territorial basis. Secondly, it must be considered how islanders may retain
their identity as a people if this is no longer possible through statehood.
STATEHOOD EFFECTIVENESS
Regarding the first question, emerging statehood as we know it today relates to the criteria of having a permanent
population, a government, the capacity to uphold international relations, and of course a defined territory. 2  Regarding
the criterion of territory, state practice teaches us that territory need not reach a threshold of size, 3  nor need boundaries
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be fixed definitely. 4  In addition, recognition by third states is a necessary confirmation of de facto statehood. 5  These
*29  requirements receive validity through the principle of effectiveness. Effectiveness serves legal order and derives
from the fact that a state arising from the will of the people and their right to self-determination must be able to represent
its citizens' rights and entertain duties as an international legal personality. Effectiveness ensures practical usability of
the notion of statehood. 6  An effective state is a necessary component in the chain of command to enforce law for its
citizens, as there exists no comprehensive international law enforcement mechanism. 7  This means that according to
current positive law, a state must have a certain degree of effectiveness and that degree of effectiveness is reached through
having a territory, population, government and capacity to enter into international relations, and declarative recognition
by third states.
However, the threshold of fulfilment of the de facto criteria for statehood and concomitant effectiveness is much lower
for the existence and continuity of a state, in comparison to the emergence of a state. 8  This low threshold boosts state
continuity and maintains legal stability. Retraction of recognition of an entity as a state is not a likely occurrence.
This is a primary reason failed states, those fully lacking the criterion of government, are still regarded as states by the
international community irrespective of the fact that for an undetermined period of time, effectiveness has taken the
backseat. In addition, a notion of legality prevents statehood discontinuance in obvious cases of breaches of international
law, most likely in cases *30  of illegal annexation (e.g. Baltic States 9 ), despite the fact that all control over the territory
is lost for an unforeseeable period of time. Hence, as the aforementioned examples demonstrate, a temporary deviation
from a sufficient degree of effectiveness is tolerated in positive international law. In such situations, recognition acts as
a stopgap to impede loss of statehood. However, a permanent deviation from a sufficient degree of effectiveness--such
as losing territory permanently--is likely unacceptable since this would amount to a permanent deviation from effective
statehood. 10
Current doctrinal considerations of the island states' future have continuously focused on retention of the islands'
statehood with or without territory. 11  The first solution, i.e. in which the island state's land is artificially restored or
replaced, firmly clings to the principle of effectiveness. The second solution, i.e. wherein an island state remains a state
in a deterritorialized form, essentially trades effectiveness for practicality or legitimacy. For both solutions statehood is
maintained. Unfortunately, the first solution or artificial *31  island solution represents a permanent cost many island
states 12  cannot bear.
The deterritorialized solution seems incompatible with the theory on statehood as it stands today and would at most
amount to the original island state's government functioning ex situ, providing predominantly diplomatic protection for
its diasporic population, as current states provide for nationals abroad. 13  This solution is oriented towards keeping
islanders on their island as long as possible and once the situation becomes untenable, ensuring-- currently absent 14 --
migration possibilities for the population which remain citizens of the uninhabitable submerged island state. The two
solutions focus solely on defending state security. However, given the problems a state security approach brings along,
a solely state-focused approach may be deemed to fall short in today's humanized international legal world which no
longer focuses only on states as the core subjects of international law, but also on individuals and peoples as such. The
emphasis in finding a solution for the islanders needs to include attention for communities, and embrace the human
security perspective alongside a state security perspective, in order to deepen our understanding of all potential scenarios
for the island states. Hence, this article situates itself within the hypothesis that *32  when a state is permanently without
a territory, it can no longer be effective and as a result can no longer be recognized as a state in positive international law
for those without the capacity to recreate habitable territory in a sustainable manner. In the sections which follow it is
explored how to consider the island states' future from a non-state-centered focus. By demonstrating first and foremost
that we have truly left the realm of an international community dominated by states. Secondly, it will be demonstrated
that the concept of human security perfectly fits within the needs of today's international community. Finally, it is
explored why the right to self-determination can be the core of a people-oriented solution for submerging island states.
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HUMANIZED INTERNATIONAL LAW
Today, we are far removed from the Westphalian world of 1648, and even from the world of unison created through
the conception of the United Nations. By no means have individuals taken over the place of states as the grundnorm of
international law, but principles of cooperation and solidarity, human rights of all generations, international criminal
law, the responsibility to protect, international humanitarian law and disaster response law herald a time wherein the
individual and the community are no longer rendered invisible by the shadows of the state at the international level. 15
*33  A Brave New World: Cooperation, Solidarity, and Human Rights
With the United Nations arrived an era of explicit emphasis on international cooperation. 16  In matters of environment
the principie of cooperation has time and time again been endorsed. 17  Moreover, for environmental management
it has been proven that transnational cooperation, especially regarding shared resources, is a preferred and more
beneficial strategy than clinging to compartmentalized territorial integrity. This indicates that sole governance over
territory need not trump cooperative environmental governance and protection. 18  Particularly in the context of climate
change, the UNHCR stated that “[i]nternational human rights law complements the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change by underlining that international cooperation is not only expedient, but also a *34  human rights
obligation.” 19 20  A binding duty to cooperate with one another is nevertheless not adequately defined in international
law.
Closely related, the principle of solidarity can be noted in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 59/193 on the
“Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order” in which is stated that “[s]olidarity, as a fundamental
value, by virtue of which global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes costs and burdens fairly, in
accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice, and ensures that those who suffer or benefit the least, receive
help from those who benefit the most.” 21  Solidarity is a concept which increasingly pops-up in international law. It is
referred to directly in the Desertification Convention, 22  the ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event
of Disaster (DAPPED) 23  and indirectly in the Rio Declaration, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). 24  Solidarity has roots reaching to times of natural law. In the
words of de Vattel, “when the occasion arises, every Nation should give its aid to further the advancement of other *35
Nations and save them from disaster and ruin, so far as it can do so without running too great a risk [ ... ]. To give
assistance in [ ... ] dire straits is so instinctive an act of humanity that hardly any civilized Nation is to be found which
would refuse absolutely to do so ... Whatever the calamity affecting a Nation, the same help is due to it.” 25
Though solidarity may appear to be a vague concept and difficult to put to use, the major asset of solidarity lies in
its flexible and spontaneous character. After all, the concept can be found in a most practical form in the Law of
the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which dictates that persons and ships in distress at sea must be helped out. 26  This
particular notion of assistance is also described in International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) 27
and International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 28  which were amended after the Tampa incident 29
to impose “coordination and cooperation” of member states so that picked up passengers could be brought ashore a
safe place as soon as possible, regardless of the nationality of those rescued. 30
*36  Finally, let us not forget about the increasing influence of the vast international and regional human rights bodies
of law which have upgraded individuals and groups from objects to subjects of international law. 31  Indeed, regional
courts such as the European Court for Human Rights and the Inter-American Court for Human Rights are available
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for individuals to bring claims, just as much as the International Criminal Court is able to bring criminal individuals to
justice. Furthermore, human rights have had an influence on international criminal law by being able to offer concrete
remedies to individuals, for example through the 2006 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law. 32 33
Law in Times of Disaster
When it comes to disaster law, times of war spring to mind. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a well-settled
part of international law regulating jus in bello conduct. IHL sprung from old codes of conduct and ad hoc traditions
and currently forms a part of customary international law, and is codified in the four Geneva Conventions (‘49) and
Protocol I and II (‘77). IHL protects those struck by war but are innocent of partaking in it. IHL is the poster child
for representing the customary principle of humanity that condemns unnecessary suffering of people. Owing to IHL,
combatants are obliged to see their captured enemies no longer as just enemies, but also as humans.
International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) is a much newer addition to international law. It is not set in times of war
as is IHL, but in times of peace and unintentional catastrophe. Here, the *37  object is to alleviate suffering of those
innocent in producing the catastrophe such as a natural hazard in the form of an earthquake, hurricane or tsunami,
and even manmade disasters such as nuclear outbreak, or a mixed origin disaster such as climate change. Due to the
broadness and often lack of precise causal link between damage and wrongdoer, IDRL has a hard time developing into
maturity and hard law. The UNHCR indeed confirms protection issues brought on by natural disaster are less visible 34
despite being omnipresent. 35  Already in 1999, Kofi Annan pointed out how the international community cherry picks
the crises tackled. 36  Time and time again calamitous events occurring through (man-induced) natural disaster are treated
as a lower priority disaster, though baby steps to progress are visible.
Following U.N. General Assembly resolutions, 37  the non-binding Inter-Agency Standing Commission Operational
Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters, 38  the Red Cross' Guidelines for the Domestic
Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, 39  and the 2003 Bruges
Resolution, 40  the International Law Commission's Draft articles on the Protection of Persons in the *38  Event of
Disaster (DAPPED) 41  can be viewed as a tool that may lead to legally binding steps which point out that in certain
situations state sovereignty should be pierced for reasons of humanity. The draft articles are innovative and refreshing
in the sense that they focus strongly on preventive action in the spirit of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction. 42
Furthermore, DAPPED distinctly takes into account multiple interests throughout its text, i.e. of both state and victims,
making it a balanced text. In addition, DAPPED focuses on both manmade and natural disaster as well as mixed origin
disaster. 43  Equally, its scope includes slow-onset and sudden-onset disaster, 44  excluding armed conflict already covered
by humanitarian concepts such as IHL. IHL has priority over DAPPED, 45  and is it unfortunate to see that armed
conflict and other causes of disaster are once again split up entirely when they ultimately have the same goal of victim
protection 46  Though DAPPED does not carry a specified duty to provide assistance, the articles have inched closer
to that line of thought by providing a procedural obligation for other states, the UN, and assisting actors in general
to give due consideration to specific requests of assistance from affected States. 47  In the past, the *39  U.N. General
Assembly has held that “the abandonment of the victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations without
humanitarian assistance constitutes a threat to human life and an offence to human dignity.” 48  Simply refusing to aid
those in need is deemed unacceptable as well by SOLAS with regard to its duty to aid those in distress at sea. In light
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of this, the masters of the ship need to put in the log book precisely why they were unable to aid those in distress.
Furthermore, the master of the ship is responsible to treat those who have embarked the ship with humanity. 49  Though
states have mixed feelings towards DAPPED, they have been a truly significant step towards securing human dignity, 50
and dealing with disaster in times of peace, 51  a matter insufficiently covered by hard international law. 52
A State Inherent Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Long before the current R2P concept, a group of doctors--the founders of Medecins sans frontieres--pushed the term
“droit *40  d'ingerence” or “‘duty of intervention”. In humanitarian crises, the rights of victims needed to stand front and
center, and not classical State sovereignty. Despite the desire to make the right to intervention a human right, this duty
of intervention was left ambiguous, it was generally understood as a moral obligation incumbent on third parties beyond
the affected state to provide assistance to victims. 53  With this legacy, the present day notion of R2P emerged from a
realization that states needed to “embrace the responsibility to protect, and when necessary ... act on it.” 54  R2P has a
broader function than humanitarian intervention in that it focuses on preventive intervention and keeps use of force as a
last resort. It also has a more narrow scope in that it is strictly limited to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and their incitement. 55  This responsibility to protect is a secondary one for
third states, 56  and only a primary responsibility for the affected state which has the duty to protect its population against
atrocities. As mentioned, R2P functions within a pre-disaster or preventive timeframe. However, R2P also functions
during the disaster or reactive phase, and in the post-disaster or rebuilding phase. 57  Furthermore, R2P does not receive
its strength from U.N. mandates or international treaties, it is a sovereign responsibility inherent to all states.
Of course, it must be remembered that R2P was put in place for internationally well-recognized crimes and that the
‘responsibility to protect’ still does not offer a clear duty to protect. Prior to the emergence of R2P, in the Kosovo
debate--wherein the illegal NATO intervention was a great stimulant for R2P, only Belgium wanted there to be a general
norm permitting intervention, other *41  NATO members agreed there is only a possibility of a moral duty to act or
a necessity. 58
Though there are safety measures for unwillingness to act, they are not perfect. If the affected state does not act,
then U.N. Security Council, U.N. General Assembly, and regional organizations are next in line. 59  In this respect
it is worth mentioning the conclusions of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, created by the
U.N. Secretary General. The panel was mandated to examine contemporary global threats and future challenges to
international peace and security, including the connections between them; to identify the contribution that collective
action could make in addressing these challenges; and to recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective
action, including a review of the principal U.N. organs. In 2004, the panel endorsed “the emerging norm that there is
a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention
as a last resort.” 60  The panel also took the suggestion of the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty to heart which indicated that self-discipline of the permanent members in exercising their veto would be
necessary. 61
HUMAN SECURITY
Labels are powerful tools in the creation of law and policy. Security situations may bring with it out-of-the-ordinary
solutions, when ordinary solutions bring no relief. How a problem is labeled and approached, is crucial for how it can be
managed. If we bifurcate security, we wind up with the more traditional notion of *42  national state security 62  on the
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one hand and human security on the other. Both state and human security can encompass a wide range of issues such
as environmental, minority group issues, and-- predominantly--military issues. 63
Human security means ensuring security from a people's perspective, instead of from a state-focused perspective. It must
be understood that human security is complementary to state security. Human security broadens the focus of security
from states and borders and moves it onto communities within and across those borders. 64  Canadian Foreign Minister
Lloyd Axworthy put it correctly when he stated that, “human security is perhaps best understood as a shift in perspective
or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing the world.” 65
Today much contemplation is given to retention of statehood of flooding island states, whereas given the concerns of
the islanders about loss of their culture due to climate change, 66  attention is due retention of cultural identity and the
community cohesion of the islanders. 67  Human security, as opposed to state security, supports such a take on the issue.
The concept can be traced back to the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, though its meaning was far from
steady at that point. 68  Proof that the concept was not a passing *43  fad came from then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, who pointed out in 2000 that human security had already joined the main U.N. agenda items of peace, state
security and development. 69
What's in a name?
In 2012, the U.N. General Assembly agreed upon a definition of human security. It is an approach--not a process on its
own--to assist Member States to address cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. 70
It is obvious human security has grown from the previously discussed aspects of a humanized international order. As a
result, human security features interfaces with these aspects. For one, just as traditional IHL, human security is about
the survival of people. Differently from IHL however, is that as human dignity stands at the core of human security,
human security goes beyond securing mere survival.
The human security approach must be people-centred, context-specific and prevention-oriented in order to strengthen
protection and empowerment of people and communities. Indeed, different from IDRL is the fact that human security
protection places itself largely in the preventive timeframe 71  and not the reactive one. As mentioned, human security is
far from a one-sided concept. For example, when transboundary mass migration hits a third state's population, human
security concerns are present not only for the displaced, but equally for the receiving state, 72  hence prevention is indeed
crucial. 73
*44  As mentioned, R2P is a system of “bridging the gap between nation state system of political management and the
global nature of risks and threats requiring cooperation and collaboration.” 74  R2P as such should not be expanded to
encompass consequences of slow onset natural disaster, or as a way to intervene in the policy of a state refusing to limit
climate pollution, but to unbundle it and use its legitimate underlying values by putting people first. 75  Indeed, much like
R2P, human security too puts people before state structures and at the heart of foreign policy. 76  Human security looks
at the international community as an important secondary player when an affected state fails to protect its people. 77  In
order to fulfil this secondary role, regional and international cooperation are vital. 78
Much ado about nothing?
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Human security has received its fair share of criticism and interpretations. It has been labeled as an annihilation of
the intellectual coherence of security that need only focus on threats of war on the state. 79  It has received the label of
only being appropriate to focus on the basic needs of individuals as a minimum. 80  Finally, the concept has been called
fuzzy, 81  unnecessary, 82  weak, 83  and most of *45  all having too broad a scope. 84  The last comment points out a
concern not to be underestimated, and presumably one of the reasons why human security is often pushed aside too
readily. It is part of the reason why R2P was eventually so strictly delineated to five core crimes. However, whereas R2P
has the ambition of being a policy in itself, human security remains an approach which for obvious reasons is much
broader than a specific policy. The concept also knows constraint. A word of warning has been added by states feeling
threatened that human security by adding to the text that at all times R2P must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and noninterference for matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states. In addition, human security must not impose
any new legal obligations on the part of states, 85  which it does not do given the nature of the concept as an approach
supporting existing rights and duties of states and people with a special focus on human rights.
Human Security Meets Climate Change
The human security approach is intended to be applied for critical and pervasive threats or situations. One of the threats
envisioned is massive population movements created by climate change. 86  Such threats may be sudden, but can also
creep in with slow onset. Likewise, threats can be orchestrated, inadvertent, direct, or indirect. 87  An indirect threat
may grow due to insufficient support of the international community in supporting those displaced, especially due to
slow onset events which were a long time coming. It is important that slow onset events are taken into account, as
today *46  these feature much less in disaster law. 88  Finally, there is no doubt human security is applicable to climate
change issues, as already human security approaches are utilized in tackling climate change on a smaller scale, usually in
close cooperation with local government. The human security approach was for example applied in tackling recurring
droughts exacerbated by climate change. In 2011, a programme was launched in the north-east of Kenya and its border
communities. By considering a people-centered approach, it was recognized that a primary concern was to ensure there
would be no competition between neighboring communities over the limited resources during droughts. Hence a platform
was constructed which enabled combining resources and capacities of communities and institutions to stabilize fragile
livelihoods and prevent competition. 89
Power to the People
Naturally, in a humanized world order, human security seeks to support human rights and strengthen human
development. Importantly, human security does not attempt “to securitize human rights issues, but rather to humanize
security.” 90  After all, human security arose to reorient security around the individual at a time when transnational norms
of human rights started to emerge. 91  An example of such arising norms can be found in a speech from U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan in 1999 when he said that “[t]he *47  State is now widely understood to be the servant of its people,
and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty--and by this I mean the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of each and every individual as enshrined in our Charter--has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness
of the right of every individual to control his or her own destiny. [ ... ] The Charter is a living document, whose high
principles still define the aspirations of peoples everywhere for lives of peace, dignity and development. Nothing in the
Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders.” 92  Truly accommodating this collective interest is
to accept that individual security or human security in the broader sense 93  means human security must trump the more
traditional notion of state security without overwriting it. 94  Hence the protection of individual human rights stands
front and center 95  in order to protect “communities” 96  as well and to empower both categories to act on their own
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behalf. 97  A human right which can bring empowerment to threatened communities such as those of the islanders is the
right to self-determination. 98
*48  SURVIVAL THROUGH EMPOWERED SELF-DETERMINATION
Recently, a study on linkages between climate change and migration was conducted by the United Nations University
Institute for Environment and Human Security in Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati. The research concluded that “[o]ne of the
more striking results from the Q study is the possible impact of migration on identity and culture.” 99  Several ‘attitudes'
were distilled from the replies received from interviewees and indeed in almost every attitude the interviews considered
future migration to have an impact on their culture and identity as a people. In addition, 7 out of 10 attitudes considered
this impact to be negative, none considered it positive, 3 out of 10 considered it neutral or did not mention it. As can
be deduced from this study, the inhabitants of the low-lying island states are most worried about how to preserve their
culture and identity if climate change makes their land uninhabitable. Another study by Jane McAdam, an authority
in the field of migration, reaches the same conclusion based on the interviews conducted by her. She adds that the
interviewees from Kiribati and Tuvalu do not link sovereignty to borders, but rather to religious, tribal, landholding and
language groups. 100  The core value a human security approach supports more fully than a state security approach is a
people's human right to self-determination which underwrites the retention of a people's uniqueness as a people, which
is a major concern of the islanders.
Regarding its precise legal scope, self-determination has grown through the years. Self-determination sprung from
Woodrow Wilson's words as a political statement, 101  and although unrecognized by the League of Nations, it was
already put to use in the 1920 *49  Aaland Islands case 102  and was used to support a decolonization policy. 103  The right
to self-determination became recognized by the United Nations in the U.N. Charter 104  and was understood to go beyond
decolonization. 105  This was confirmed by embedding the right in the 1966 human right covenants, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 106  and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). 107  According to the Human Rights Committee, the human right as described in article 1 ICCPR,
especially paragraph 3, “imposes specific obligations on States parties, not only in relation to their own peoples but vis-
à-vis all peoples which have not been able to exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right
to self-determination.” 108  This reading of article 1 corresponds with the Friendly Relations Declaration by the U.N.
General Assembly in which was stated that “Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action,
realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” 109  Furthermore the right was confirmed
to function erga omnes in the *50  ICJ East Timor judgment 110  as well as the ICJ advisory opinion on the Wall in
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 111  Due to its erga omnes status, a people's right to self-determination is part of
international customary law, 112  and even part of jus cogens. 113
Many a definition has been proffered regarding the content of self-determination itself. The U.N. Charter has not done
much to help this complication by only mentioning the principle of self-determination of peoples in the Charter. 114
The Charter's preparatory works however do stipulate that the principle of self-determination implies the right to self-
government, but not a right to secession if self-determination would be exercised within an existing state. 115  Indeed, only
such a principle seems enforceable. Though U.N. resolutions and declarations have continued to confirm and solidify
the right to self-determination, it has not succeeded in entirely clarifying its contents. 116  The ICJ has referred to self-
determination as the “freely expressed will of peoples.” 117  The ICPPR offers the following definition: “All peoples have
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and *51  freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development.” 118  In order to secure economic, social, and cultural development,
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the right to use of their natural wealth and resources as part of customary law, 119  is inherent to peoples and their right
to self-determination. 120  Of course, today's principle of territorial integrity ensures that this right to self-determination
remains limited by the right of self-determination of other peoples. 121
Who are ‘we, the people’?
Who as a ‘people’ are the beneficiaries of the right to self-determination, remains a matter of dispute in international
law. 122  From its preparatory works, it is obvious the U.N. Charter distinguishes between Peoples, Nations, and States.
Whereas ‘State’ refers to a type of political entity, ‘Nation’ is a term which can be used for any political entity, states
and non-states. Finally, in a rather broad interpretation, ‘Peoples' was viewed to refer to groups of human beings which
may but do not need to comprise states or nations. 123  Hence the Charter speaks rather of political entities and groups
of human beings, rather than persons in a particular geographically delineated area. Initially, the ICCPR crippled the
broad definition of ‘Peoples' of the Charter. At the very least state *52  inhabitants and colonized people would qualify
as peoples, though the human rights covenants excluded minorities, therein including indigenous peoples. 124  Indigenous
peoples and minorities have remained nebulous categories of alleged peoples. 125
Minorities consist of persons belonging to a group and sharing a common culture, language, and/or religion. 126
Importantly, minorities do not need to be recognized as such by the state in which they reside, a qualification as a minority
is entirely dependent on objective characteristics. 127  In the past the Committee strictly pegged indigenous peoples as
minorities and evaded any question on the applicability of the right to self-determination to indigenous peoples, 128
but in more recent years the committee has started *53  referring to the relevance of the right of self-determination of
indigenous peoples as a means of interpretation of rights under article 27 as minorities. 129  This evolution is also reflected
in articles 3 and 4 of the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
It is relevant whether migrants may qualify as a minority. The HRC affirms this in the positive. 130  What is more,
even visitors to a state may qualify as a minority. 131  In order to temper this rather liberal definition of the HRC,
a--nevertheless low 132 ---threshold of permanence may be required of the migrants. If such permanence would not be
required at all, the rights of minorities would become applicable to rather most any group of people and render the rights
of minorities void due to broadness and impracticality.
Minorities receive protection under article 27 of the ICCPR to preserve their culture, language or religion as an individual
human right. 133  The state in whose territory the minority resides has both negative and positive obligations to ensure
this protection. 134  *54  For example, active measures of the state may be required to ensure retention of culture of a
minority. Even more so, it may be necessary to ensure involvement of minorities in decisions which specifically affect
them. 135  To invoke such measures, the relevant group of minorities does not need to be a citizen of the state in which the
minority group resides. 136  However, additional guarantees for minorities to take part in public affairs and elections will
only be available if the minority member is a citizen of the relevant state. 137  Beyond minority rights as described within
the scope of the ICCPR, it may be possible for severely oppressed minorities to become qualified as peoples having a
right to external self-determination. Such a right to external self-determination may materialize in the form of seceding
from a mother state. This right has been described as “an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State
lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees” 138  to ensure the rights of minorities.
It appears at the very least the islanders--as a totality of inhabitants of a specific island nation today--can be viewed as
a people enjoying the right to self-determination as materialized in their independence as a state. If the islanders were to
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move en masse they would still objectively be able to qualify as a people and at the very least as a minority in their new
place of residence. As a people, they would receive the right to internal self-determination and political representation,
alongside every other citizen of the state in which they would reside. Additional, or as an alternative, to their rights as a
people, or separately, as a minority, the islanders would have rights to support then culture, language and/or religion. 139
*55  Self-sufficient Peoplehood
In order to substantiate a right to self-determination with a right to the use of their natural resources to further
development, islanders would preferably retain economic benefits from their natural resources. 140  The issue here is
that once their original island territory wanes, so do baselines retract and maritime zones shrivel as they are measured
from such a retracted baseline. 141  This means that to be self-reliant the maritime paradigm of land dominates the sea is
problematic. If it can be relinquished, it can enable islanders' retention of economically important maritime zones without
continuing existence of baselines. The last decade a development is visible of stabilizing maritime zones and translating
maritime boundaries into agreements as much as possible in an attempt to congeal maritime boundaries. Lately the
trend has intensified. The latest bilateral and trilateral agreements between several Pacific Island States--in which they
settle almost all their thus far disputed maritime boundaries--are exemplar. 142  In addition, in 2016 the Marshall Islands
declared all their maritime boundaries to the United Nations declaring the exact locations of baselines and outer limits
of their maritime zones. 143  By doing this, the Marshall Islands hope to solidify their *56  maritime boundaries de jure
even if those zones would fluctuate or disappear de facto. In a world of globalization and global governance, it is not
unthinkable that maritime zones can be managed perfectly well by other-than-state entities without a nearby territorial
basis to operate from, as much of the area today is chopped up into exploration zones and governed by seabed mining
companies with the approval of the U.N. and set up by the International Seabed Authority.
Empowerment of people is brought on by allowing them to be self-reliant. 144  On a legal level, this can be done by
provision of self-determination and supporting the attached right of a people to their natural resources. In addition,
human security's credo is to ask not what can we do but, how can we build on the efforts and capabilities of those
which are directly affected by the circumstances. 145  For the Small Island Developing States, this can mean building
on their capacities to form an asset to the host state if transboundary migration becomes inevitable. Such a process of
‘migration with dignity’ has already begun on Kiribati 146  which means to prep its residents by giving them the right
skills to bode well abroad. One of the goals of Kiribati's National Labour Migration Policy (NLMP) which was created
in cooperation with the International Labour Organisation, is to “ensure that Kiribati as a nation, culture and people
will not perish as a result of climate change.” 147  This labour migration policy shows that islanders are planning ahead,
yet receive conflicting assistance. Whereas the ILO has helped Kiribati develop its labour migration policy, much more
international cooperation is needed between the Pacific Islands and potential host states.
*57  Getting Priorities Straight
Future scenarios for the islanders need to be assessed in light of who the state serves, meaning its population. In this
respect, I would like to evoke the U.N. Secretary-General's speech indicating that “[t]he State is now widely understood to
be the servant of its people, and not vice versa.” 148  Human security translates the idea of putting people first as is fit in a
humanized international order. It represents a novel view on the role of sovereignty and statehood and puts state security
in perspective. Irrespective of practical difficulties, replacement of territory seems a straightforward and functional
solution, if it is durable. The same cannot be said for deterritorialized solutions. On the recognition of a deterritorialized
state, McAdam states that “the continuing recognition of a non-existing state is to some degree academic” 149  and I could
not agree more. Not only is a deterritorialized state incompatible with positive law on statehood, retaining islanders
in situ for as long as possible may lead to rather quick, testable and ad hoc approaches once territory finally becomes
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entirely uninhabitable. This may bring on scattered migration resulting in diaspora, which after an initial period of
continued recognition as a deterritorialized state will likely lead to full integration in or assimilation with the host state,
losing all avenues for retaining the islanders' right to self-determination and their culture, one of the biggest concerns of
the islanders in relation to climate change and migration.
Islanders will likely be better off focusing on the islanders' needs instead of the island's needs. This can be reflected by
relinquishing the desire to uphold state security approaches at all costs when it leads to virtual statehood. Human security
as an approach in today's humanized international legal world draws attention to the islanders' needs going beyond mere
individual physical survival and aims for complete support of the islanders' *58  human right, here in particular the
human right to self-determination.
This entails that self-determination is protected by providing the islanders with land territory, most preferably (artificial)
land in the very spot their current island is found as the islanders' cultural identity is closely tied to their territory. In
this scenario, the islanders' self-determination indeed still materializes in the form of statehood which is in line with
objective statehood criteria. The willingness of the international community to cooperate on this matter should be great
as they wish to avoid even more migratory issues. Should migration be unavoidable, staggered 150  and negotiated mass
migration is the preferable solution. This way ties through transnational communities with the new host community are
slowly built up and can be consolidated through a self-determ ination right for the resettled islanders as a people or a
minority with retention of cultural identity.
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